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become	concerned	 that	 the	party	might	become	 linked	with	 land	speculation.	 In	response	 they	
proposed	significantly	to	increase	the	tax	rate	on	land	value	gains	(Weiler,	2013).		
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producers	and	consumers.	Landowners	must	now	absorb	a	greater	proportion	of	
the	cost	of	off-site	infrastructure	by	reducing	land	prices.	This	is	a	pre-requisite	
for	making	their	land	developable.	
	
The	vehicle	for	achieving	this	transfer	of	resources	was	the	evolving	system	of	
planning	obligations.	Planning	obligations	(POs)	are	defined	in	planning	
agreements	that	were	first	given	statutory	recognition	in	the	Town	&	Country	
Planning	Act	1932	(Amodu,	2006).	They	were	originally	detailed	procedural	
devices	that	were	used	to	address	particular	problems	raised	by	developments	
that	could	not	be	solved	through	the	use	of	planning	conditions;	for	example,	to	
provide	adequate	site	access	by	correcting	deficiencies	in	off-site	transport	
infrastructure	or	services.	Through	their	use,	POs	might	allow	development	to	
proceed	where	otherwise	it	would	not.	During	the	1980s	and	1990s,	as	the	
financial	environment	of	local	authorities	became	increasingly	austere,	there	was	
a	broadening	in	the	scope	and	an	expansion	in	the	use	of	POs	from	this	quite	
specific	base.	For	example,	POs	began	to	require	the	provision	of	affordable	
housing,	of	social	and	community	facilities	or	of	public	open	space	(Campbell	et	
al,	2000).	This	trend	was	encouraged	by	government,	at	least	partly	because	
there	were	no	suitable	alternative	mechanisms	available	for	redistributing	and	
recovering	the	costs	and	benefits	of	development.		
	
During	the	New	Labour	years,	consideration	was	increasingly	given	to	the	‘…	
scope	for	improving	the	efficiency	of	the	planning	system	through	the	use	of	
economic	instruments	in	planning	policy	…’	(DETR,	1998,	8)	such	as	POs.	One	
constraint	on	their	use	was	a	necessity	test	that	limited	the	scope	of	obligations	
that	might	be	imposed	on	developers.	This	significantly	reduced	the	opportunity	
to	use	POs	to	support	local	service	provision,	resulting	in	pressure	for	additional	
public	expenditure	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	development	(DETR,	2001,	17).	In	
contrast,	if	more	widely	used	and	defined,	POs	would	act	as	“…	a	mechanism	to	
ensure	that	development	provides	social,	economic	and	environmental	benefits	
to	the	community	as	a	whole.”	(DETR,	2001,	3)	This	sharing	of	the	benefits	of	
development	with	the	community	was	subsequently	confirmed	as	a	fundamental	
aspect	of	the	PO	system	(ODPM,	2003,	para.18a).	
	
Now,	by	omission,	planning	obligations	have	become	a	vehicle	
through	which	development-related	infrastructure	and	service	
provision	may	be	funded	[…]	Yet	their	use	as	economic	instruments	
has	occurred	in	a	piecemeal	way.	(Campbell	et	al,	2000,	760)	
	
Such	changes	reflected	the	broader	shift	in	the	British	state	away	from	direct	
provision	of	services	and	towards	complex	regulatory	approaches	using	state	
power	to	renegotiate	market	relations	(Moran,	2003;	Levi-Faur,	2005).	However,	
the	increasing	importance	of	developments	as	a	source	of	finance	for	the	
mitigation	of	development	impact	and	the	provision	of	development	
infrastructure	posed	two	significant	problems	for	policymakers.		
	
The	first	was	the	fear	that	“…	authorities	risk	asking	for	too	much,	thereby	
threatening	the	viability	of	development.”	(DETR,	2001,	13).	On	the	one	hand,	
POs	should	benefit	society	and	contribute	to	economic	growth	but,	on	the	other	
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hand,	they	should	not	be	so	onerous	as	to	deter	development	(ODPM,	2003,	para.	
18).	However,	while	this	was	the	first	time	that	development	viability	had	been	
explicitly	linked	to	PO	policy,	consideration	of	the	“…	issue	of	whether	or	not	a	
development	proposal	is	capable	of	bearing	the	burden	of	mitigating	all	its	own	
costs	…”	(ODPM,	2004,	9)	was	taken	little	further.	The	Government’s	formal	
position	on	this	point	was	‘open’	(see	ODPM,	2005,	10-11,	para.	B10).	This	
encapsulates	the	essential	elements	and	highlights	the	internal	tensions	of	roll-
out	neoliberalism.	The	centrality	of	market	forces	in	guiding	development	was	
advanced	but	the	state	remained	a	powerful	actor	in	shaping	the	economic	
domain.		
	
The	second	problem	related	to	the	implications	that	the	continued	expansion	of	
the	use	of	POs	had	for	planning.	In	order	to	increase	the	transparency	and	
consistency	of	relevant	decisions,	policies	relating	to	POs	were	incorporated	in	
most	development	plans	by	2000	(Campbell	et	al,	2000;	Campbell	and	
Henneberry,	2005).	This	rendered	PO	policies	a	material	consideration	in	
determining	planning	applications	(ODPM,	2003,	para.	37).	Decisions	were	based	
not	only	on	a	proposal’s	functional	appropriateness	but	also	on	its	ability	to	meet	
the	costs	of	mitigating	its	likely	impact.	This,	in	turn,	is	determined	by	the	
development’s	value	and	profitability.	The	result	is	that	“…	essentially	financial	
matters	…	[became]	…	material	to	many	planning	decisions	…”	(Campbell	et	al,	
2000,	773,	square	bracket	added)	resulting	in	the	“…	marketization	of	the	
planning	process	…”(Campbell	et	al,	2000,	774).	
	
Economists	agreed.	Corkindale	(2004,	57)	suggested	that	“…the	most	obvious	
way	in	which	such	voluntary	trading	takes	place	in	British	land	use	planning	is	
through	the	device	known	as	‘planning	gain’	or	‘planning	obligations’.”	Indeed,	
“Planners	[will]	have	to	adjust	to	a	world	in	which	the	economic	as	well	as	the	
planning	logic	of	what	they	do	is	not	just	analysed	but	central	to	their	concerns.”	
(Cheshire	and	Sheppard,	2004,	2,	square	bracket	added).	Such	third-order	ideas	
now	challenged	the	forces	previously	mediating	their	effects	at	the	meso	and	
micro	levels	of	planning	practice.	
	
The	vehicle	for	this	incorporation	of	economic	logic	into	planning	is	the	concept	
of	viability.	Its	application	is	informed	by	financial	information,	the	provision	of	
which	was	first	formally	mentioned	in	Circular	05/2005	(ODPM,	2005)	in	
relation	to	the	determination	of	levels	of	affordable	housing	to	be	included	in	
residential	developments	(McAllister	et	al,	2013,	496).	Subsequently,	the	
evidence	base	of	core	strategies	and	other	development	plan	documents	was	
required	to	cover	viability	(DCLG,	2008).	Next,	PPS3:	Housing	(DCLG,	2010)	
made	it	necessary	to	assess	the	economic	viability	of	affordable	housing	targets	
(Coleman	et	al,	2013).	This	drive	to	establish	the	significance	of	financial	
considerations	in	planning	was	reinforced	by	the	National	Planning	Policy	
Framework	(DCLG,	2012).		
	
Pursuing	sustainable	development	requires	careful	attention	to	
viability	and	costs	…	[developments]	should	not	be	subject	to	such	a	
scale	of	obligations	and	policy	burdens	that	their	ability	to	be	
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developed	viably	is	threatened.	(DCLG,	2012,	41,	square	brackets	
added)	
	
Thus,	over	the	last	15	years	development	viability	has	become	an	important	
aspect	of	the	UK	planning	system	(Crosby	et	al,	2013).	It	informs	policy	relating	
POs	and	the	Community	Infrastructure	Levy	(CIL),	affordable	housing	and	land	
allocations.	It	underpins	negotiations	between	local	planning	authorities	and	
developers	over	specific	sites.	However,	there	has	been	considerable	debate	over	
the	definition	and	application	of	the	concept	of	viability.	The	RICS	(2012)	issued	
guidance	on	financial	viability	for	planning	purposes	that	defined	it	as	follows.	
	
An	objective	financial	viability	test	of	the	ability	of	a	development	
project	to	meet	its	costs	including	the	cost	of	planning	obligations,	
while	ensuring	an	appropriate	Site	Value	for	the	landowner	and	a	
market	risk	adjusted	return	to	the	developer	in	delivering	that	project.	
(RICS,	2012,	4)	
	
It	noted	that	‘The	residual	appraisal	methodology	for	financial	viability	testing	is	
normally	used	…’	(RICS,	2012,	14).	Thus	the	RICS	was	claiming	the	objectivity	of	
the	results	of	a	residual	valuation	as	a	justification	for	using	the	techniques	as	the	
means	of	determining	the	viability	of	a	scheme.	This	was	despite	the	long-held	
view	that		
	
…	it	is	a	feature	of	the	residual	valuation	that	comparatively	minor	
adjustments	to	the	constituent	figures	can	have	a	major	effect	on	
results	…	[and	that]	…	once	valuers	are	let	loose	on	residual	
valuations,	however	honest	the	valuers	and	however	reasoned	their	
argument	they	can	prove	almost	anything.	(First	Garden	City	Ltd	v	
Letchworth	Garden	City	Corporation	(1966)	200	EG	123,	460).	
	
It	was	also	in	the	face	of	recent	robust	technical	criticism	of	the	residual	method	
and	mounting	evidence	of	its	proneness	to	gaming	by	developers	to	reduce	levels	
of	POs	(Crosby	and	Wyatt,	2016;	McAllister,	2017).		
	
Following	research	sponsored	by	a	group	of	London	Boroughs	(Sayce	et	al,	2017)	
and	a	recent	landmark	judgement	of	the	High	Court	on	the	matter	(see	Crosby,	
this	issue),	policy	guidance	on	DVA	has	been	changed.	Gone	is	the	imperative	in	
the	NPPF	2012	to	ensure	that	POs	do	not	threaten	viability.	Instead,	the	NPPF	
2018	states	that	“Where	up-to-date	policies	have	set	out	the	contributions	
expected	from	development,	planning	applications	that	comply	with	them	should	
be	assumed	to	be	viable.”	(MHCLG,	2018,	16)	This	position	is	emphasized	by	the	
latest	guidance	on	viability	that	stresses	that	evidence	used	to	assess	land	values	
should	be	“…	based	on	developments	which	are	compliant	with	policies,	
including	for	affordable	housing	…”	(HMG,	2018,	paragraph	14)	Thus	a	
reappraisal	of	the	detailed	operation	of	the	extant	LVC	system	is	currently	
underway	(see	Crosby,	this	issue,	for	a	detailed	discussion).	However,	the	
principles	that	underpin	the	system	are	not	in	question.	
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The	effect	of	the	shift	to	a	neo-liberal	approach	to	LVC	
As	we	have	seen,	corporatist	approaches	to	LVC	were	intended	both	to	reinforce	
the	effectiveness	of	the	land	use	planning	system	and	to	obtain	for	the	
community	(at	least	a	significant	share	of)	the	increase	in	land	value	arising	from	
its	efforts.	They	had	no	effect	on	development	costs	or	capital	values.	Rather,	
they	were	focused	on	taxing	land	development	values.	Consequently,	their	
primary	effect	was	on	the	behaviour	of	landowners	and	the	operation	of	the	land	
market.	Tax	rates	were	the	same	for	all	types	of	development	in	all	locations.	The	
tax	monies	were	recycled	through	the	Exchequer	and	it	was	not	obvious	that	
they	would	be	used	in	ways	that	would	benefit	landowners	(such	as	by	paying	
for	the	provision	of	off-site	infrastructure	to	enable	development	to	occur).	
	
Practice	relating	to	POs/CIL	is	markedly	different.	Their	subject	is	the	developer	
not	the	landowner.	They	affect	both	the	capital	value	of	a	development	(which	is	
reduced	by	the	inclusion	of	affordable	housing)	and	a	scheme’s	development	
costs	(that	now	include	a	contribution	to	the	provision	of	infrastructure),	
thereby	reducing	land	development	value	(Figure	1c).	Effectively,	this	is	the	
equivalent	of	an	indirect	tax	on	development	value	but	it	is	structured	quite	
differently.	Any	obligations	or	levies	must	be	directly	related	to	development	and	
must	be	of	a	scale	and	nature	necessary	to	mitigate	its	impact.	The	proceeds	of	
POs/CIL	are	hypothecated.	Landowners	and	developers	can	see	that	they	are	
used	for	purposes,	primarily	the	provision	of	off-site	infrastructure,	which	allow	
land	to	be	developed.		
	
As	the	use	of	POs	grew	rapidly	after	2000,	there	was	debate	about	whether	they	
might	be	augmented	or	replaced	by	a	tax	on	development	value,	either	directly	
through	Planning	Gain	Supplement	(House	of	Commons,	2006)	or	through	
community	land	auctions,	a	form	of	municipal	land	trading	(Leunig,	2011).	In	the	
event,	POs	were	paired	with	CIL	and	the	system	continued	to	be	cost-base.	Tax	
and	charge	regimes	have	different	advantages	and	disadvantages	(Henneberry	
and	Goodchild,	1996).	A	tax	on	some	element	of	land	or	property	values	goes	
with	the	financial	structure	of	the	market.	If	tax	rates	are	uniform,	the	relative	
impact	on	different	parts	of	the	property/land	market	is	the	same.	“…	only	if	all	
land	is	taxed	at	the	same	flat	rate	…	will	there	be	no	distortion	in	land	use.”	
(Whitehead,	2016,	23)		
	
In	contrast,	the	pattern	of	charges	based	on	development	impact	differs	from	
that	of	market	strength.	Economic	factors	determine	property	values.	Physical	
factors	such	as	the	scale	and	nature	of	development	determine	development	
impact.	Property	values	display	marked	regional,	sectoral	and	temporal	variation.		
The	costs	of	the	physical	works	necessary	to	mitigate	development	impact	vary	
relatively	little.	Consequently,	weak	markets	are	faced	with	much	greater	
adjustment	problems	than	strong	markets.	Charges	raise	development	costs	in	
London	and	the	South	East	by	a	much	lower	proportion	than	in	other	regions.	In	
this	sense,	charging	systems	are	regressive	in	their	effects.	This	is	evident	from	
the	outcomes	of	the	negotiations	over	planning	obligations.	POs	accompany	a	
much	higher	proportion	of	planning	permissions	granted	by	authorities	in	the	
South	than	in	the	North	and	the	average	value	of	the	obligations	is	significantly	
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higher	in	the	South	than	the	North	(Campbell	et	al,	2000;	Crook	et	al,	2006,	2008,	
2010;	Henneberry,	2016).		
	
Conclusions	
	
Discursive	institutionalism	provides	a	framework	within	which	to	consider	the	
ways	that	fundamental	changes	in	political	economy	play	themselves	out.	While	
it	has	been	criticised	for	its	limited	ability	to	make	strong	causative	claims	for	the	
power	of	ideas,	its	elasticity	as	a	concept	makes	it	useful	for	coping	with	the	
heterogeneity	of	real-world	processes.		Neoliberalism’s	rise	to	dominance	has,	in	
practice,	been	messy	(Harvey,	2005;	Peck	2010).	The	macro-level	shift	in	the	
climate	of	ideas	after	1979,	while	clear,	was	far	from	a	‘clean	break’.	Analysts	of	
the	Thatcherite	project	who	focus	on	macro-level	(third-order)	ideational	change	
(e.g.	Jessop	et	al.,	1988)	tend	to	stress	discontinuities.	In	contrast,	those	focusing	
analysis	on	meso	and	micro	levels	(second-	and	first-orders)	tend,	instead,	to	
emphasise	the	unevenness	of	policy	change,	including	policy	continuities	(Hay	
and	Farrall,	2011).	Such	differences	in	analytical	focus	are	not	logically	
incompatible.	Gaps	between	radical	macro-ideational	change	and	more	
incremental	change	at	meso	and	micro	levels	might	arise	from	implementation	
failures	or	intentional,	strategic	in/action	(Hay	and	Farrall,	2011).		
	
These	tendencies	are	evident	in	the	area	of	LVC.	The	country	has	a	long	history	of	
debate	and	policy	experimentation	relating	to	the	issue.	Using	discursive	
institutionalism,	we	have	shown	how	third-order	changes	in	political	economy	
affect	the	land	market	and	how	these	interact	with	policy	and	practice	at	meso	
and	micro	levels	of	planning	(summarised	in	Table	1).	The	impact	of	ideas	is	not	
immediate	and	can	be	heavily	mediated	or	even	resisted.	As	the	corporatist	era	
demonstrated,	economic	(landowning)	interests	were	able	to	prevent	the	
implementation	of	betterment	schemes.	This	was	achieved	because	such	action	
was	supported	by	the	Conservative	Party	that	reversed	various	Labour	policies	
for	LVC.	However,	such	reversals	were	not	complete:	the	planning	system	
inaugurated	by	the	1947	Act	remained	largely	intact	and	the	normative	claim	
that	the	community	should	have	the	right	to	a	share	of	development	values	has	
endured,	albeit	evolving	significantly	over	time.	
	
Table	1:	Applying	Discursive	Institutionalism	to	Land	Value	Capture	
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Similarly,	the	increasing	influence	of	neoliberalism	on	the	form	of	LVC	policy	was	
uneven	and	incremental,	only	taking	effect	from	the	Millennium.	Until	then,	the	
planning	system	had	been	able	to	ameliorate	the	effects	of	neoliberalism.	
However,	the	increasing	deployment	of	economic	instruments	had	a	significant	
impact	in	three	ways.	First,	planners	were	confronted	with	the	need	to	
incorporate	market	viability	as	a	material	consideration	in	reaching	decisions.	
Neoliberalism	has	advanced	economic	rationality	and	economic	rationality	has	
advanced	neoliberal	reasoning	in	planning	practice.	Planners	have	to	engage	
with	market	actors	on	different	terms	from	the	corporatist	era	as	a	consequence	
and	find	themselves	contesting	the	form	of	such	economic	concepts	as	
development	viability.	Second,	and	relatedly,	planning	is	increasingly	embedded	
in	the	practices	of	the	regulatory	state	(Moran,	2003)	that	emerged	from	
neoliberalisation	in	the	UK.	Third,	the	land	market	itself	has	been	affected	by	
economic	instruments	as	is	demonstrated	by	the	regionally	regressive	effects	of	
the	PO/CIL	regime.		
	
What	are	the	implications	of	this	analysis	for	planning	practice?	At	present,	
planners	are	faced	with	a	conflict	between	cognitive	and	normative	ideas	about	
how	they	should	respond	to	a	more	market	orientated	planning	system.	On	the	
one	hand,	market-driven	practice	challenges	the	institutional	ethic	of	a	planning	
profession	rooted	in	the	institutionalisation	of	the	welfare	state.	On	the	other	
hand,	in	an	era	of	ever-increasing	constraints	on	local	government	funding,	the	
benefits	of	obtaining	additional	resources	through	effective	PO/CIL	policy	and	
practice	are	clear.	Thus	far,	this	conflict	has	been	managed	by	planners’	focus	on	
improving	site-level	approaches	(c.f.	the	debate	over	project	viability	and	the	
gaming	of	land	valuation).	However,	in	order	to	maximise	the	benefits	from	
POs/CIL,	it	is	necessary	to	pursue	market	sensitive	and	economically	aware	
approaches	in	relation	not	just	to	individual	projects	but	also	to	longer-term	
development	plan	policies	and	their	application.	For	example,	there	may	be	an	
area	of	high	demand	where,	for	some	reason,	development	has	been	restricted.	
Allowing	schemes	to	go	ahead	may	garner	substantial	developer	contributions	
that	result	in	the	construction	of	major	new	infrastructure.	In	turn,	this	may	
remove	constraints	on	the	development	of	less	valuable	land	elsewhere	in	the	
plan	area.	Other	policy	objectives	are	then	achieved,	to	the	overall	benefit	of	the	
locale.	There	is	no	evidence	that	planners	have	adopted	such	approaches	and,	
through	them,	faced	up	to	the	wider	strategic	implications	of	their	position.	
	
Discursive	institutionalism	can	make	important	analytical	contributions	to	
planning	studies	beyond	LVC.	While	regard	is	already	paid	to	both	macro	and	
micro-level	ideological	shifts,	planning	studies	could	fruitfully	develop	more	
nuanced	analyses	of	policy	change	by	using	discursive	institutionalism	to	
examine	how	such	changes	in	policy	are	set	in	train	and	how	they	are	justified,	
while	also	recognising	the	inherent	messiness	of	such	transitions.	The	flexibility	
of	the	concept	means	that	it	may	be	applied	widely.	However,	as	our	paper	has	
shown,	its	use	is	most	effective	when	the	subject	policy	is	underpinned	by	an	
essential	aspect	of	political	economy	that	exhibits	significant	change.	A	suitable	
candidate	for	study	would	be	the	extension	of	permitted	development	rights	that	
has	occurred	since	1979	and	particularly	in	the	last	10	years	(see	Bibby	et	al,	
	 16	
2018).	This	may	be	seen	as	an	embodiment	of	the	de-regulatory	urge	within	
neoliberalism.	It	offers	considerable	analytical	potential.	
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